US DOUBLE AGENT TIPS TEHRAN RE McKEE TRAVEL PLAN – 20/12/1988

[Diary of a Vengeance Foretold] Part 171

DECEMBER 20 1988

“Twenty-four hours before the flight, Mossad tipped off the German BKA that there could be a plan to plant a bomb on flight 103. The BKA passed on their tip to the CIA team working out of Frankfurt who said they would take care of everything.”

Joel Bannerman, publisher of an Israeli intelligence report, 1994.

Today, Dec. 20 1988, Charles McKee changed his flight ticket and was rebooked on Pan Am 103 Dec. 21. Major McKee was a senior army officer on secondment to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). McKee was on assignment in Beirut trying to locate the American hostages held at that time by Hezbollah.

Matt Gannon, the CIA Beirut station Chief, is also rebooked on Pan Am 103 Dec. 21. Finally, also today, Larivierre is equally rebooked on Pan Am 103 Dec. 21.

 Khalid Jaafar called his father and told him that he would be home tomorow. Khalid told his father that he is having a good time and that his “friends” had taken him to various places.

Khaled Nazir jaafar

Khaled Nazir Jaafar

McKee called his mother and also announced his return. That would seem quite innocent if it was not for the fact that he never did that before. McKee never announced his return to his mother before his arrival in the US. His phone call from Beirut terrified her mother. From his behavior during his Thanksgiving return, she suspected that something was not quite right. Now, she knew for sure that something was very wrong.

“Meet me at the Pittsburgh airport tomorrow night,” McKee told his mother.

“This was the first time Chuck ever telephoned me from Beirut,” McKee’s mother said.

“I was flabbergasted. It’s a surprise. Always before he would wait until he was back in Virginia to call and say he was coming home.”

McKee’s mother says she is sure her son’s sudden decision to fly home was not known to his superiors in Virginia.

Tehran Is Tipped Off

 Dr Ali Nuri Zadeh was given very precise information regarding the bombing of an Am 103 form a high level cleric close to Grand Ayatolah Montazeri. (NB. It is worth pointing out that Montazeri was the person who leaked the Irangate scandal to the media.) Dr Zadeh reported the following events.

On Dec. 20 1988, an engineer employed by the Frankfurt airport authority received the green light to carry out the operation from Rasul Qassab Qarai. (NB. Qarai was the Iranian consul in Frankfurt at the time.)

According to Zadeh source, the date was chosen after the Iranian embassy in Beirut had received information to the effect that five American intelligence agents were setting out for America via Frankfurt and via Pan Am flight. (NB. It is highly unlikely that the Iranians knew of Joseph Patrick Curry. One is left wondering who the fifth US agent was. DCF 12 comes to mind…)

The report continues as follows:

“The unsuspected courier had previously travelled to Sweden and was to be used as the conduit to place the device on board. The suitcase containing the device was attached to the courier baggage after he checked in.”

“In this way, the bag would not be tracable. The courier was a Lebanese from a family of heroin producers who opposes Hizzbullah. He was tricked in thinking that he was used as a mule for a normal drug shipment for his American contacts. He had been instructed that his American handler would meet him aboard the flight.”

 The Interror Pact is formalized

On Dec. 18 1988, the Iranian embassy in Beirut hosted a conference at the Carlton Hotel titled: “International Conference in support of the Palestinian Intifadah”. The conference was hosted by Iran foreign Minister Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati.

In his concluding statement read on Dec. 20, Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati made an oblique reference to the “approaching of the ordained revenge on America for its crime against the Iranian civilian airliner.”

Puzzle piece

The most serious allegation against Megrahi, the Libyan accused of the bombing of Pan Am 103, was that Magid Giaka, a former colleague and CIA asset since mid august 1988, claimed that he had seen them on December 20 at Luqa airport bringing from Tripoli a Samsonite luggage identical to the one in which the bomb that destroyed Pan Am 103 was hidden.

However, a CIA cable reveals that during the afternoon of December 20, Giaka was reporting to his CIA handler. The cable sent on December 21 makes no mention whatsoever of this most significant event.

“The most important witness in the Lockerbie trial was systematically torn to pieces,” the New York Times reported following his testimony at camp Zeist.

In July 1991, Giaka was transported aboard the USS Butte where he was interviewed by FBI agents. When asked about the primary suitecase, Giaka answered frankly:

“I do not know anything about a suitcase.”

But months later, Giaka will say:

“Oh that suitcase! That was sometimes in September, October, maybe November or perhaps December.”

His final statement reads:

“It was on Dec. 20 that I saw the brown Samsonite suitcase carried by Fimah and Megrahi at Luqa airport.”

What prompted Giaka to experience such phase transitions across which he went from knowing nothing to be able to remember the smallest detail with the greatest accuracy? Surely, he must have had a pretty good motivation. Come to think of it, the former CIA asset received four millions of them.

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